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This article criticizes radical labor republicanism on republican grounds. 
I show that its demand for universal workplace democracy via workers’ 
cooperatives conflicts with republican freedom along three different di-
mensions: first, freedom to choose an occupation . . . and not to choose 
one; second, freedom within the very cooperatives that workers are to 
democratically govern; and, third, freedom within the newly proletarian 
state. In the conclusion, I ask whether these criticisms apply, at least in part, 
to the more modest, incrementalist strand of labor republicanism. To the 
extent that they do, delaboring republicanism might be the best response.
Contemporary (or neo)republicans have only recently begun to debate the implications of their theory for political economy, especially regarding labor 
markets. The summum malum for all republicans, contemporary or classical, is 
slavery, and they are understandably concerned that the relationship between 
capitalists and workers can, at least under certain circumstances, parallel that 
between masters and slaves. If workers are poorly informed, face monopsonistic 
or oligopsonistic labor markets, and have few resources at their disposal, they may 
be in a position to be dominated by their employers, who can exercise arbitrary 
power over them with little to no fear that they will exit in response. Company 
towns like early twentieth-century Matewan, West Virginia, were often studies in 
labor servitude, despite operating within a legal system of ostensibly “free labor.”
 A subset of republicans, commonly referred to as “labor republicans,” have 
responded to this problem of employer power and workers’ corresponding vul-
nerability by turning to the kinds of solutions that classical republicans applied 
to the state itself in order to prevent it from becoming a dominating force. These 
solutions to state domination came in two forms. The first, the participatory ap-
proach, gave citizens a voice via contestatory democracy, which consists of “not 
only electoral rights but also the effective opportunity to contest the decisions of 
their representatives . . . [through] impartial ‘courts of appeal’ [that] can include 
the press and the streets as well as more formal channels of protest.”1 The second, 
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the constitutional approach, safeguarded citizens by means of the dispersal of 
power, such as the checks and balances associated with the separation of powers, 
bicameralism, federalism, and international legalism.2 Labor republicans have put 
both of these approaches to work in the economic sphere. For example, in labor 
markets with concentrated employer power, they have favored solutions both par-
ticipatory (e.g., labor involvement in managerial decisions through German-style 
“works councils” and even socialism) and constitutional (e.g., the countervailing 
power of either the state through democratic regulation or workers by means of 
privileges to form unions and strike).
 This description may understate the internal diversity of labor republican-
ism, however. For example, on the more moderate and reformist end of the 
labor-republican spectrum, Nien-hê Hsieh proposes what he calls a “workplace 
republicanism” that “constrains the discretion of managerial decision-making” 
(e.g., by means of legal regulations) and “provides institutional guarantees for 
workers to be able to contest managerial directives as part of the decision-making 
process internal to economic enterprises” (e.g., through union representatives).3 
Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson argues for reforms both participatory (e.g., works 
councils) and constitutional (e.g., “a workers’ bill of rights . . . [with] more robust 
protections of workers’ freedom to engage in off-duty activities, such as exercis-
ing political rights, free speech, and sexual choices”4). Both authors keep their 
distance from more drastic solutions, though, including workplace democracy.5 
Their approaches to constraining employer power are generally modest, incre-
mentalist, and institutionally flexible.6
 By contrast, those scholars at the radical end of the labor-republican spectrum 
focus almost exclusively on participatory approaches, demanding universal work-
place democracy by means of workers’ cooperatives as the solution to capitalist 
domination. Michael Sandel, for example, offers a rather laudatory portrait of 
labor-republican advocates of a “cooperative commonwealth,” one in which “the 
wage system” would be replaced, by means of both “political action” and “strikes 
and trade unions,” with “a scheme of cooperatives in which workers would share 
in the profits of labor and govern themselves.”7 Alex Gourevitch, who acknowl-
edges his debt to Sandel, more directly endorses a cooperative commonwealth, 
supporting a “mixture of [worker] control rights at the national and local, firm 
level. At the very least, it would include democratic control over productive as-
sets and equal worker control over the conditions and processes of work.”8 These 
changes would be revolutionary in nature, replacing capitalism with a kind of 
associational socialism; Gourevitch freely admits that “centralization and some 
amount of coercion are unavoidable” in realizing this dramatic transformation.9 
At the same time, though, the appeal of such an approach is clear. If we refuse 
to tolerate unilateral, unaccountable rule in government, then why should we 
tolerate it in the workplace? Why shouldn’t democratic means be used here, too, 
to constrain arbitrary power?
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 My main task in this article will be to criticize this radical strand of labor re-
publicanism on grounds internal to republicanism itself. In the first section, I will 
set the stage for what follows by describing and comparing two ideal-theoretic 
republican economic models; throughout the article, I will ordinarily compare 
these ideal models with one another rather than with existing institutions. In 
the second section, I will argue that the radical demand for universal workplace 
democracy via workers’ cooperatives conflicts with republican support for free-
dom as non-domination (hereafter FND) along three different dimensions: first, 
freedom to choose an occupation . . . and not to choose one; second, freedom 
within the very cooperatives that workers are to democratically govern; and, third, 
freedom within the newly proletarian state. Finally, in the article’s conclusion, I 
will turn to the question of whether these criticisms apply, at least in part, to the 
more modest, incrementalist kind of labor republicanism represented by Anderson 
and Hsieh. To the extent that they do, delaboring republicanism might be the best 
response.
Two Economic Models of Republicanism
To fix ideas, consider two different economic models. The first, embraced by San-
del and by Gourevitch, is associational socialism (hereafter AS), which demands 
public ownership of all non-labor factors of production via workers’ cooperatives. 
It entails universal worker self-management, whether direct or indirect (by the 
election of supervisors), and is therefore anti-statist, emphasizing labor’s right 
to control land, capital, and the production process itself. David Miller describes 
AS’s constitutive workplace environment as follows:
A co-operative is taken to be a productive unit democratically controlled on 
a one person–one vote basis by everyone who works in it. Its capital may 
be owned, individually or collectively, by the members or leased from an 
outside agency, but in any case carries no rights of control. The profits of the 
co-operative are shared by the members according to an agreed schedule and 
constitute their income.10
The second economic model, property-owning democracy (hereafter POD), in-
volves widespread private ownership of land and capital (physical, financial, and 
human) in order to “put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs,” as 
Rawls, one of its foremost advocates, puts it.11 It offers a petit bourgeois rather 
than a social democratic vision of economic democratization, one achieved via 
inheritance taxation, “capitalist” demogrants, and so on. Demogrants could come 
in the form of small-business awards, seed money for playing the stock market 
or for purchasing an annuity to subsidize a low-paying but rewarding vocation 
(e.g., topiary gardening), educational vouchers, and so forth. Notice that POD 
permits but does not require worker self-management: workers are free to pool 
demogrants, for example, and practice voluntary syndicalism, owning and running 
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their own workplaces with or without the support of elected managers.12 However, 
they may also opt for traditional, hierarchical capitalist employment relations, 
whether as employers or as employees. Under POD, citizens are empowered by 
both competitive markets (for products, services, and production factors, espe-
cially labor) and demogrants to select any kind of workplace environment they 
prefer, whether by creating one, joining one, or leaving one.
 These workplace environments will, of course, operate with varying degrees of 
productive efficiency, as measured by the cost (in terms of the factor payments, 
e.g., payroll) of producing a given quantity and quality of output (i.e., products, 
services, and/or produced factors), which will itself be a function of not only factor 
prices (e.g., wage rates) but also managerial practices and production technologies. 
Some preferences for workplace environments may be quite expensive to satisfy 
(in terms of lost income, leisure, and opportunities) compared to preferences for 
more productively efficient alternatives, like hierarchical assembly line settings.
 As even its supporters (including David Miller and John Stuart Mill) admit, the 
cooperative workplace is beset by a variety of inefficiencies, all of which result 
from its fundamental feature: workers owning and running their own workplaces. 
First, because workers will tend to maximize income per capita rather than total 
profits, a cooperative will do less hiring than a capitalist firm and will consequently 
remain inefficiently small.13 Second, because cooperative ownership is indivisible, 
the effective time horizon of the median voter-worker will be short compared to 
that of a capitalist, leading to chronic underinvestment: Why reinvest profits and 
“deepen capital” when many if not most of the benefits will accrue to a younger 
generation of workers? Trying to solve this problem by introducing divisibility 
(e.g., permitting workers to own shares of the cooperative that can be sold at a 
future date) merely converts the cooperative into a joint-stock company, that is, a 
capitalist enterprise.14 Finally, the cooperative ownership structure makes spread-
ing risk more difficult for its member-workers, leading them to make excessively 
conservative management decisions, for example, resisting innovations in produc-
tion techniques and technologies.15 These inefficiencies will place cooperatives 
at a significant cost disadvantage vis-à-vis traditional capitalist firms.
 These theoretical predictions may seem to conflict with the real-world perfor-
mance of some worker-participatory firms (e.g., the Mondragon cooperatives in 
Spain, employee stock ownership plans [ESOPs] in the United States, etc.) and 
economies (e.g., the co-determination system in Germany) that appear to compete 
effectively with traditional capitalist firms and economies, but they do not. First, 
all of these examples fall far short of being cooperative firms and economies: 
Mondragon has a mixture of divisible and indivisible ownership, ESOPs are 
fully divisible (after vesting) and usually constitute only partial ownership of 
the firm, and German co-determination involves no ownership by employees 
and merely minority representation on management boards. Second, even if 
these firms and economies were entirely cooperative, they might still be able to 
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compete effectively with more traditional ones by paying lower wages, demanding 
longer hours, and so on; therefore, competing successfully does not necessarily 
demonstrate equal productive efficiency. Finally, even if we were to observe fully 
cooperative firms competing successfully without offering lower wages, and so 
on, we would have to worry about the issue of worker self-selection: cooperatives 
may attract more skilled or conscientious workers (given that these qualities are 
likely correlated with a preference for self-management), in which case they might 
be able to compete effectively with traditional firms. This would be comparing 
apples and oranges, however, as the quality of labor would then be higher in the 
former than the latter, while impartial productive-efficiency comparisons assume 
equal-quality inputs. The only fair test, then, is at the economy level, in which 
all workplaces are cooperative and thus high-quality workers cannot self-select. 
There has been only one large-scale test of this kind, however: Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
whose unique experiment with AS featured precisely the under-employment, 
under-investment, and under-innovation predicted by economic theory.16
 The cost disadvantages of cooperatives tend to make them uncompetitive in 
open markets with more efficient workplaces, for example, hierarchical assembly 
lines. However, they might still be able to compete effectively in such environ-
ments by paying lower wages, demanding longer hours, and so on, which would 
keep labor costs down and allow prices to be set at rates comparable to those of 
more traditional workplaces. Whether laborers would agree to this, given com-
petitive labor markets and the exit options made available by POD, would hinge 
upon the strength of labor’s taste for them. Their defenders, of course, would 
contend that their costs—for example, forgone income (lower wages and ben-
efits), leisure, and/or opportunities—are outweighed by their benefits, especially 
working-class autonomy and solidarity.17 Property-owning democracy puts both 
workplace environments within reach, but for a price: workers must bear the full 
costs of their expensive tastes for inefficient but fulfilling employment settings.
 Some authors, like Mill, have suggested that AS might spontaneously evolve by 
voluntary means out of POD or even presently existing capitalism.18 Workers could 
scrape together capital through savings, loans, or perhaps gifts and bequests from 
sympathetic capitalists, creating the economic basis for self-management; POD 
would make this process far more feasible. The result would be an immaculate 
conception of AS, unsullied by expropriation or revolutionary violence. Given 
the heterogeneity of worker preferences for workplace environments, however, 
it seems extremely unlikely that anything approaching AS would emerge in 
such a voluntary fashion. Property-owning democracy would surely increase the 
prevalence of workers’ cooperatives, but that is a far cry from the universality 
of worker self-management envisioned by AS. Only some workers are likely 
to share the idiosyncratic and expensive tastes of Sandel and Gourevitch, who 
often seem as motivated by civic-humanist and Marxist assumptions about the 
good life, respectively, as by republican worries regarding domination.19 If so, 
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the extent of worker self-management under POD would fall (far) short of what 
AS demands.
 Such a democratic deficit in the workplace must be rectified, according to AS, 
and if labor will not voluntarily seize the opportunity POD provides to do so, 
then perhaps a less voluntaristic approach is necessary. Worker self-management 
may have to be imposed in ways that fail to track the workplace preferences of 
labor. The need for such guidance by a properly enlightened socialist vanguard 
suggests why AS might, in the long run, diminish FND in a way problematic 
from a neorepublican point of view—as I now hope to demonstrate.
Radical Labor Republicanism versus Republican Freedom
The first way in which AS is inconsistent with the republican commitment to 
FND is with respect to worker freedom to choose an occupation . . . and not to 
choose one. When I choose to work in a non-participatory workplace, I choose 
to be a simple wage laborer. If I am instead required to work in a cooperative, as 
AS demands, then I am forced to become both a wage laborer and a co-manager, 
either directly or indirectly (via delegation).20 By assumption, however, I did not 
want to be a co-manager, and forcing someone to take a job that he or she does 
not desire is a clear violation of free choice of occupation and employment. Given 
the importance of this liberty to freely shape our own lives (the sine qua non of 
personal autonomy), we betray republican values if we sacrifice it for the sake 
of building working-class autonomy and solidarity, a Marxist preoccupation.
 Free choice of occupation is a liberty that is closely associated with liberals such 
as Rawls, but it is also embraced by republicans, especially Pettit himself.21 Pettit 
includes “the freedom to change occupation and employment” among what he (like 
Rawls) calls the “basic liberties”; these liberties, “secured by public resourcing and 
protection,” are necessary for realizing a “full and meaningful life” and for secur-
ing the status of each as “a free person.”22 As for this latter point, Pettit maintains 
that the basic liberties protect essential (co-exercisable and co-satisfying) choices 
“that people ought to be enabled to make, and to make without the domination 
of others—without dependency on their goodwill and forbearance.”23 Within the 
framework of universal cooperatives demanded by AS, my ability to escape the 
occupation of co-manager—to “change occupation and employment,” as Pettit puts 
it—hinges on the “goodwill and forbearance” of my fellow workers, a majority 
of whom must vote to either grant or deny such an exception to cooperative poli-
cies on joint management. But this is precisely the kind of dependency that Pettit 
always condemns . . . and associates with Rousseau, who appears “to celebrate a 
form of dependency upon the will of the corporate whole—in effect, the will of 
the majority—at odds with a vision of freedom as non-domination.”24
 A socialist-republican like Sandel or Gourevitch might object here that a right 
to exit from cooperative co-management responsibilities would be exactly like 
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a right to exit from political co-management responsibilities by giving up one’s 
political liberties: both of these rights to exit are effectively rights to servitude, to 
having vitally important decisions made on one’s behalf by either an economic 
elite (capitalists) or a political elite (dictators or oligarchs), respectively. But such 
a strong analogy between economic enterprises and the state will not withstand 
much scrutiny. In a nation-state, the right of control can be effectively exercised 
only by means of voice (protesting, voting, etc.), as exit is too costly. This is 
simply not true of workplaces, though, at least under the competitive conditions 
and resourced exit that POD offers. Empowered workers can demand the work-
place conditions they desire via open, competitive labor markets (be it by entry, 
exit, or the creation of new workplaces). Voice—the power to participate in the 
determination of workplace rules—is unnecessary to provide workers with the 
control that they deserve over their conditions of employment, though voluntary 
syndicalism does remain an option under POD. They vote with their feet instead. 
The socialist-republican objection fails because there’s a key disanalogy between 
workplaces and political societies: workers, unlike citizens, can be given control 
by means of the market rather than the forum. Gourevitch would retort that this 
gives workers nothing but a choice among different capitalist masters, leaving 
capitalism’s structural domination in place.25 This might be true for welfare-state 
capitalism, but it is not true for POD: given large capitalist demogrants, workers 
are not beholden to capitalists, be it individually or as a class, because POD turns 
all citizens into capitalists; it abolishes the domination of the capitalist class by 
universalizing private capital ownership.
 The second way in which AS is inconsistent with the republican commitment to 
FND is with respect to worker freedom within the very cooperatives they demo-
cratically govern. Under AS, each cooperative workplace is a miniature demos, 
authorized to pick whatever rules or policies or to make whatever executive deci-
sions that a majority of voter-workers will temporarily support. To repeat Pettit, 
this is “a form of dependency upon the will of the corporate whole—in effect, 
the will of the majority—at odds with a vision of freedom as non-domination.”26 
What forms will this dependency and the resulting arbitrary power of worker 
majorities take? Consider the issue of worker participation in cooperative decision 
making. Once workers have replaced the capitalists as the masters of their work 
environment, one might expect an easygoing attitude toward worker compliance 
with co-management and production duties, a live-and-let-live attitude in sharp 
contrast with the cruel and exploitative discipline of capitalists and their manage-
rial cronies—but this would be a mistaken expectation, at least for cooperatives 
that have any prospect of surviving long-term. In a cooperative workplace, the 
benefits of self-management are a public good enjoyed by all workers: a well-run 
cooperative firm will yield a bigger surplus to be shared by all workers, ceteris 
paribus, than a badly run one. If this is so, then a worker-run firm is highly 
likely to require participation and enforce it by censure, fines, threats of firing, 
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and so forth, lest worker free-riding cripple its efficiency. Shirkers, in short, will 
be curbed by proletarian discipline, whether in their roles as co-managers or 
producers. This is perhaps why Mill, himself an admirer of cooperatives, says 
that “their rules of discipline, instead of being more lax, are stricter than those of 
ordinary workshops.”27 Whether such strict discipline can be meted out without 
arbitrariness is a question I will leave to students of human nature.
 The problems with handing arbitrary power to worker majorities do not end 
there, however. For example, what would prevent such a majority from discrimi-
nating in hiring, promotion, firing, and so forth, on such grounds as race, gender, 
or national origin? The long and shameful history of the labor movement on these 
issues (e.g., the American Federation of Labor’s restrictionist position on legal 
immigration during the bulk of the twentieth century) does not fill one with con-
fidence. More generally, what would prevent such a majority from singling out 
vulnerable individuals or groups within the cooperative for abuse? The potential 
for domination, humiliation, and exploitation does not simply disappear when we 
convey arbitrary power from capitalists to worker majorities: only the identities 
of the potential abusers change.28
 There are various ways we could prevent or at least counter the exercise of 
such arbitrary power, but, as we’ll see, radical labor republicans have often ruled 
these out due to their peculiarly zealous commitment to what I have called the 
participatory approach. The first and most obvious way to deal with these problems 
is with the complementary constitutional approach, as the more moderate and 
institutionally flexible labor republicans like Anderson and Hsieh have suggested. 
For example, worker majorities enamored of Taylorism, say, or of interfering in the 
political lives of workers in the name of working-class solidarity (e.g., threatening 
to fire any workers who voice support for pro-capitalist parties) could be curbed 
by means of “a workers’ bill of rights” imposed by state-regulatory agencies or 
the court system.29 Worker majorities of a racist, misogynistic, or xenophobic 
bent could be countered by guaranteeing the speech and associational rights of 
minorities internal to cooperatives (e.g., empowering them to form internal labor 
unions and go on strike against their own cooperatives). Radical labor republicans 
have been oddly silent about this second possibility (internal unions)—possibly 
due to misplaced faith in working-class unity—and actively dismissive of the 
first (state regulation). Gourevitch, for example, is decidedly skeptical of state-
regulatory solutions to the problem of domination, calling them “slow moving” 
and “a crude instrument,” and hopes that in a cooperative commonwealth, “a 
substantial amount of regulation would no longer be needed.”30 As the above 
examples suggest, however, abandoning “a substantial amount” of labor regula-
tion would be ill-advised, even under AS.
 An entirely different approach to dealing with arbitrary worker majorities is 
to ensure that cooperatives are embedded within highly competitive and prop-
erly resourced labor markets so that workers in abusive places can exit them 
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(individually or in groups) or at least credibly threaten to do so with the aim of 
modifying majority behavior. As I discussed in the last section, this is POD’s 
central strategy, so to speak, for thwarting domination in all types of workplaces, 
be they traditional or cooperative. Radical labor republicans could import a vari-
ety of POD’s policy instruments into AS (e.g., antitrust law, a basic income, and 
mobility vouchers . . . though obviously not the capitalist demogrants). Again, 
however, they appear to be highly doubtful of the efficacy of exit: Gourevitch 
worries that the “threat [to exit] is often either not credible or inadequate” and 
therefore that “exit is an inadequate substitute for voice.”31 By responding in this 
way, though, he implicitly relies upon a false dichotomy between pure exit and 
pure participatory voice, using the infeasibility of the former to argue for the 
necessity of the latter. As we have seen with the more moderate labor republicans 
like Anderson and Hsieh, however, there is a Third Way available. The radical 
labor republicans fail to see that, once constitutional and exit-oriented approaches 
are added to the mix, universal workplace democracy (versus, say, Hsieh’s more 
modest workplace republicanism) may be unnecessary . . . and even unwise, for 
the reasons canvassed above and below.
 The third and final way in which AS is inconsistent with the republican com-
mitment to FND is with respect to worker freedom vis-à-vis the newly proletarian 
state. Lovett and Pettit note that a “free state . . . promotes its citizens’ freedom 
from domination, without itself coming to dominate them”; republicanism’s task 
is therefore to minimize total domination, that is, the sum of private and public 
(i.e., state) domination.32 Labor republicans have focused almost exclusively on 
one kind of private domination: the domination of workers by capitalists and their 
managers. As we saw above, however, there are other kinds of domination that 
labor republicans should concern themselves with. Not only can worker majori-
ties dominate individual and minority workers within cooperatives, but the newly 
proletarian state envisioned by radical labor republicans might itself become a 
threat to everyone’s FND, capitalists and workers alike—or so I shall argue.
 Recall that a genuine cooperative commonwealth “would include democratic 
control over productive assets and equal worker control over the conditions 
and processes of work.”33 Replacing capitalism with AS in this way would be a 
revolutionary transformation, in two senses of that word. First, consider that in 
the United States in 2014, the top 1 percent of adults owned over 37 percent of 
the net personal wealth, so equalizing control over productive assets and work 
would necessitate a sweeping redistribution of property rights—the expropriators 
would truly be expropriated.34 No such redistribution has ever been accomplished 
peacefully; doing so without bloodshed would, in fact, be historically unprec-
edented. Walter Scheidel’s recent book The Great Leveler has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, over thousands of years, only violent events of four kinds 
have dramatically reduced inequality, which he labels the “Four Horsemen of 
Leveling”: to wit, “mass-mobilization warfare, transformative revolutions, state 
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failure, and lethal pandemics.”35 He sums up the evidence for the second of the 
Horsemen, which is the most relevant for our purposes, as follows:
Over the course of about sixty years, from 1917 into the late 1970s . . . com-
munist revolutionary regimes successfully forced down inequality through 
expropriation, redistribution, collectivization, and price-setting. The actual 
amount of violence expended in the implementation of these measures varied 
hugely between cases, with Russia, China, and Cambodia on one end of the 
spectrum and Cuba and Nicaragua on the other. Yet it would go too far to con-
sider violence merely incidental to forcible leveling: even though it would in 
principle have been possible for Lenin, Stalin, and Mao to achieve their goals 
with more limited loss of life, sweeping expropriations crucially depended on 
the application of at least some violence and a credible threat of escalation.36
The fact that such drastic redistributions of property have always been accom-
plished by systematic state violence against capitalists and workers alike does 
not rule out the possibility that some future attempt, like that urged by the radical 
labor republicans, might be peaceful, but it does raise some extremely important 
questions about the great risks involved and who would bear them.37
 What have the radical labor republicans had to say about these questions? Pre-
cious little, as it turns out, and what they have said is not reassuring. Gourevitch, as 
I noted earlier, admits that because “the cooperative commonwealth [is] a challenge 
to the economic prerogatives of an entire class, it would require ongoing central 
coordination to create, let alone maintain”; in the course of doing so, the “hege-
monic agent would have to be the dependent class of workers itself” and “[state] 
centralization and some amount of coercion [would be] unavoidable.”38 Given the 
sanguinary history of socialist revolutions, these equivocations are entirely inad-
equate. Radical labor republicans have a moral obligation to explain, in painstaking 
detail, how they plan to take us from the capitalist present to the socialist future 
without violence—or, if such a peaceful transition is admitted to be improbable, 
they’ll need to tell us why violence would then be justified, especially given the 
existence of powerfully domination-curbing alternatives like POD.
 Radical labor republicans might respond that advocates of POD are likewise 
obligated to show that their ideal, which would also entail a great deal of redistribu-
tion, can be achieved without violence. This is a fair point, so I shall briefly respond. 
First, we should notice that POD is, despite appearances, not an egalitarian or even 
a prioritarian economic model, but a sufficientarian one. Its goal is not to equalize 
ownership and control, differing with AS merely as to whether the property should 
be public or private; instead, it is to guarantee that everyone has access to adequate 
private property, especially capital in its various forms, in order to “put all citizens in 
a position to manage their own affairs,” that is, to achieve economic independence.39 
Consequently, the bar for achieving distributive justice under POD, while certainly 
high, is much lower than it is for AS and so less likely to require state violence—
and provoke counter-violence—in its implementation and maintenance than is 
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AS. Second, nearly all of the policy instruments required to implement POD have 
already been adopted within advanced capitalist economies in one form or another, 
even in the United States, so they would simply need to be scaled up to achieve 
POD’s goals: for example, mobility vouchers (see the federal Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program’s relocation assistance), capitalist demogrants (see the Small 
Business Administration’s subsidized loan program), and conditional basic income 
support (see the federal Earned Income Tax Credit) already exist in embryonic 
form and could be brought to maturity through significantly greater funding and 
a broader mandate. In contrast, AS has few contemporary precedents, particularly 
in the United States: there are only 500 workers’ cooperatives employing 8,000 or 
so people.40 Again, POD looks much more politically feasible than AS in dealing 
with domination by capitalists and their managers—and, as a bonus, is significantly 
less likely to devolve into a FND-obliterating left-wing totalitarianism.
 I will close this section by considering one more potential reply of radical labor 
republicans, not to one or another of my claims but rather to my whole line of 
criticism: that the FND-denominated costs I have identified here, even if real, 
are outweighed by the huge benefits in that same currency. I should acknowledge 
that, in the course of my critique of AS, I have probably underemphasized its 
considerable domination-reducing benefits. In fact—setting aside for one moment 
my concerns about the potential for revolutionary violence—I believe that AS 
would be a serious improvement in FND terms over presently existing capitalism, 
even taking into account my first two criticisms. Especially in the United States, 
we are much less removed from Matewan, West Virginia, than we would like to 
think. Consider the fact that even in the high-tech industry, where labor markets 
are fluid and employees are highly mobile, Google, Apple, Intel, and Adobe just 
recently colluded in a scheme not to solicit one another’s employees, success-
fully exploiting their software engineers for years before being discovered and 
successfully sued for antitrust violations.41 Contrast these workers with the more 
numerous ones who are poorly informed, face monopsonistic or oligopsonistic 
labor markets, and have few resources at their disposal. Their great vulnerability 
puts them in a position to be dominated by their employers, who can exercise 
arbitrary power over them just as the lords of old did over their serfs. The potential 
of worker majorities under AS to restrict FND should not be underestimated, but 
I admit that it pales beside the abuses of economic power under capitalism as it 
is currently constituted and that AS offers us an appealingly direct solution: de-
mocracy. Were workers empowered to govern their own workplaces, capitalistic 
domination would be eliminated in one fell swoop, and managerial domination 
would at the very least be severely limited, as labor would then have the ability to 
appoint, discipline, and fire those same managers. The gain in FND terms would 
surely be worth the accompanying loss, and the unilateral and unaccountable 
power of capitalists and their managerial lackeys would become as much a thing 
of the past as the feudal abuse it so closely resembles.
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 Having acknowledged this, two concerns remain—and I think they are ultimate-
ly decisive. First, the twentieth-century experience with revolutionary socialism, 
which includes a death toll numbering in the tens of millions, cannot readily be 
set aside. Radical labor republicans have not offered us a clear explanation of 
how, contrary to all historical precedent, they plan to expropriate the expropriators 
without violence, and even if they could offer a plausible story, the risks would 
still be substantial, to put it mildly. Second, and relatedly, running such risks 
would (or should) be morally unthinkable if equally FND-protective alternatives 
are available, and as I have maintained throughout this article, POD is just such 
an alternative. Were AS and presently existing capitalism the only options, we 
would face a cruel dilemma. But this is not the choice republicans face, despite 
the radical-republican reframing effort. Property-owning democracy is on the 
table and is, as I argued above, more politically feasible to boot. Consequently, 
I believe the correct republican choice is evident.
Conclusion
As we have seen, radical labor republican ardor for AS has dubious republican cre-
dentials. In fact, AS is questionable on the distinctively republican ground of FND: 
first, AS’s requirement of universal workplace democracy is in sharp tension with 
free choice of occupation, a basic liberty endorsed by both liberals and republicans 
like Pettit; second, AS exposes individual and minority workers to arbitrary power 
possessed by worker majorities within cooperatives, but radical labor republicans 
are highly skeptical of the very strategies (both constitutional and exit-oriented) 
that would be needed to thwart such threats of majoritarian domination; and, third, 
radical labor republicans offer little detail about the transition from the capitalist 
present to the socialist future—a worrisome lacuna, given that all prior successes 
at radically redistributing control over the non-labor factors of production have 
involved methodical state violence and a left-wing totalitarianism as dangerous to 
the freedom of workers as that of capitalists. In light of these varied and potent con-
siderations, contemporary republicans would be well-advised to steer clear of AS.
 All through my article, I’ve played the two wings of labor republicanism against 
each other, but can the criticisms I have leveled against radical labor republican-
ism be applied, at least in part, to the more moderate, reformist strand of labor 
republicanism represented by Anderson and Hsieh? To the extent that they can, a 
full delaboring of republicanism might be the best response. Although a definitive 
resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, I can at least sketch a 
few of the more important considerations here. First and most obviously, given 
the more modest ambitions of the moderate labor republicans, I do not see how 
their reform proposals could possibly constitute a slippery slope to systematic 
state violence and totalitarianism. Believing so would be a kind of Hayekian 
precautionism gone sour.
PAQ 33_4 text.indd   276 12/9/19   11:20 AM
 DELABORING REPUBLICANISM 277
 With regard to the first two of my freedom-based objections, however—violat-
ing free choice of occupation and threatening majoritarian tyranny—they might 
be more vulnerable. Both Anderson and Hsieh rely upon participatory elements 
in their reform packages, with works councils or labor unions directly involved in 
managerial decision making. As I argued earlier, such involvement has costs in 
terms of FND: regarding the first objection, workers have to spend time, whether 
directly or indirectly (by selecting and monitoring delegates), co-managing 
workplaces with capitalists and their managers, though they might not have the 
slightest interest in doing so; regarding the second objection, works councils and 
labor unions can themselves be dominating agencies, with arbitrary power at hand 
to be deployed against capitalists, managers, and—most troublingly—their fel-
low workers, whether individually or as members of vulnerable minorities. Were 
the only institutional options either our current system or the reform package of 
moderate labor republicans, I think the right choice would be the latter, even in 
light of these FND costs, due to the even greater threat to FND from capitalists and 
their managers under the current dispensation. But this would once again be a false 
dilemma. An institutional Third Way is obtainable: POD, the exit-oriented strategy 
for minimizing workplace domination, which has no need for participatory or con-
stitutional supports except in extremis (e.g., the gross abuses of sexual harassment 
or discrimination). Property-owning democracy avoids the FND costs associated 
with the moderate labor republican policy package by relying almost wholly on exit 
instead of voice, the market instead of the forum, and it has been backed by some 
influential contemporary republicans.42 As I said earlier, it is beyond the scope of 
this article to assess the relative attractiveness of moderate labor republicanism and 
POD, which would depend upon the answers to a number of difficult empirical 
questions (e.g., Could exit become as free and easy as POD’s proponents seem to 
believe?), but if POD could be shown to be generally superior to moderate labor 
republicanism, then the case for delaboring republicanism would be compelling.
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